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REDISCOVERING FRANCIS LIEBER: AN 
AFTERWORD AND INTRODUCTION 
Michael Hen* 
I 
In our media age, more and more people are famous just for 
being famous, rather than for any particular achievement, notori­
ous or otherwise. We spend a good deal of time transfixed by ce­
lebrities" known for no obvious qualities other than fame itself. 
Francis Lieber, once this country's most respected law professor,^ 
of whom it was written in 1873 that "his fame will be secure in the 
lap of history,presents the opposite case: he is forgotten despite 
great accomplishment. At best, one might say he is famous for be­
ing forgotten. His name comes up, but almost every modem refer­
ence to Lieber points out that few remember who he was.^ 
Lieber himself may well have feared being forgotten—he per­
petually viewed himself as undervalued—but not because that was 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
1 Paul D. Carrington, Meaning and Professionalism in American Law, 10 CONST. 
COMM. 297, 304 (1993) ("Lieber was recognized by his contemporaries, including James 
Kent and Joseph Story, as perhaps the premier legal academic of antebellum times."). 
2 M. RUSSELL THAYER, THE LIFE, CHARACTER, AND WRITINGS OF FRANCIS UEBER 
50 (1873), reprinted in 1 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER 13 (Daniel 
C. Oilman ed., 1881). Ton,»c 
3 In addition to most of the contributions to the present symposium, see, e.g., James 
Farr, The Americanization of Hermeneutics: Francis Lieber's Legal and Political Hermeneu-
tics in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS 83,84,98 (Gregory Leh ed., 1992) (Lieber s work important 
but "relatively unattended to," Lieber "virtually forgotten"); James Farr, Herrr^neutical 
Political Science, in HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY 65, 66 (1986-1987) (Lieber's works languish 
unread on library shelves"); M.H. Hoeflich, Roman and Civil Law in American l^gal Edu­
cation and Research Prior to 1930: Preliminary Survey, 1984 U. III. L. FEV 719 722 
("IFlew Columbia faculty today recall that the second appointment to the faculty of the 
Columbia Law School in 1857 was Francis Lieber."). Reviewing the Eskndge and Fnckey 
legislation casebook. Judge Richard Posner notes that the book is slim on philosophical 
material, but does "include an illuminating passage by the neglected Gemian-Ameri<an 
hermeneuticist, Francis Lieber." Richard A. Posner, Book Review, 74 VA. L. Itov. 1567, 
1570 n.4 (1988) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY O^OO))-
As if to confirm the neglect, Posner then misstates the title of Lieber's Legal and Political 
Julia Ward Howe, who was a friend of Lieber's, confidently predicted that "the works 
which preserve the essence of his laborious and eventful life must surely grow in interest if 
the world does not greatly deteriorate in wisdom." Julia W. Howe, Dr. Francis Lieber, 
CRITIC, Dec. 30,1882, at 351. I leave to the reader whether Lieber's fading away demon­
strates that Howe was wrong about his work or right about the world. 
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what he felt he deserved. "I know," he wrote, "that my work be­
longs to the list which begins with Aristotle, and in which we find 
the names of Thomas More, Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, Puffendorf.'"* 
While most would deem this assessment a bit of an exaggeration, 
Lieber deserves better than he has received. The present sympo­
sium aims to correct the oversight, for there is a good deal more to 
say about Lieber than that he has been forgotten. 
In this issue the Cardozo Law Review republishes Lieber's 
Legal and Political Hermeneutics,^ the work of his which offers the 
best combination of readability, brevity, and interest to the modem 
audience. The Review has also solicited nine commentaries that 
elaborate on the issues Lieber's works raise, and compiled an ex­
tensive bibliography of works by and about Lieber for those wish­
ing to read further. 
This Essay serves as an afterword to Lieber's text and an intro­
duction to the articles that follow. Following a brief biographical 
sketch of Lieber, I will highlight some important themes from 
Lieber's work and the accompanying essays. 
II 
Franz Lieber (the Francis came later, in America) was bora in 
1800 in Berlin.® His family was intensely nationalistic and 
Francophobic (or, in the words of Lieber's friend Charles Sumner, 
4 FRANK FREIDEL, FRANCIS LIEBER: NINETEENTH CENTURY LIBERAL 165 (photo, re­
print 1968) (1947). Similarly, Lieber once offered the following list of the most prominent 
political philosophers during the century preceding 1850: Montesquieu, de Tocqueville, and 
himself. Id. at 275; see also BERNARD E. BROWN, AMERICAN CONSERVATIVES: THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF FRANCIS LIEBER AND JOHN W. BURGESS 16-18 (1951) (quoting 
Lieber as asserting that he would "not rest until I force the political and legal world to 
quote me"). 
5 FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS: PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRE­
TATION AND CoNSTRUcrioN IN LAW AND POLITICS (William G. Hammond ed., 3d ed., St. 
Louis, F.H. Thomas & Co. 1880) (1837), republished in 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1883 (1995). 
[In subsequent citations, the page number as it appears in the republication will be given in 
brackets following the page citation to the third edition.] 
6 Lieber's birthdate is in dispute. The date usually given is 1800. See, e.g., Paul D. 
Carrington, The Theme of Early American Law Teaching: The Political Ethics of Francis 
Lieber, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 339,358 (1992); 6 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 236 
(Dumas Malone ed., 1936). Freidel, however, concludes that Lieber was bom in 1798. 
FREIDEL, supra note 4, at 3 n.4. 
Except as otherwise noted, the following biographical material is drawn from 
FREIDEL, supra note 4. This is the standard and definitive full-length biography. Other 
biographical material is listed in A Lieber Bibliography, with Annotations, 16 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2321 (1995). The best short biographical treatment is Carrington, supra, at 356-68. 
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"gallophobic")/ and it was with feverish enthusiasm that in 1814 
the teen-aged Lieber volunteered to fight against Napoleon.® He 
was seriously wounded at Namur, a battle that was part of the Wa­
terloo campaign. After a lengthy recuperation, he returned to his 
studies in Berlin, becoming a disciple of Friedrich Jahn. In 1819 
Jahn and many of his followers were arrested; Lieber was held in 
prison for four months and upon his release forbidden to study at a 
Prussian university. He then enrolled at the University of Jena, 
from which, on the strength of a grand total of four months of 
study, he received a Doctor of Philosophy degree in 1820. There 
followed brief periods of study at Halle and Dresden. 
In January 1822 Lieber left for Greece as a volunteer in the 
war of independence with Ihrkey. This venture did not turn out as 
planned, and, after a few months, a bitter and wholly disillusioned 
Lieber made his way to Rome. There he fell in with the historian 
Berthold Niebuhr, who was then the Prussian Ambassador to the 
Vatican. He spent a year in Niebuhr's household, working as a tu­
tor to the Ambassador's children, before returning to Germany to 
begin studies at Halle. He was once again imprisoned, however, 
this time on the basis of suspicions, apparently unfounded, that 
he was involved in an assassination plot. Niebuhr's intervention 
prompted his release, but he was not allowed to renew his studies 
or to work. 
In 1826, Lieber made his way to London as a stowaway. He 
spent a year in that city, working as a tutor. In keeping with a 
7 Nys quotes a letter from Sumner to his brother, in which he mentions "the 'gal-
lophobia' which you have observed in our friend Lieber." Ernest Nys, Francis Lieber—His 
Life and Work (pt. 1), 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 84, 87 (1911). In Hermeneutics and throughout 
Lieber's work, England is generally the model of how to go about things; France almost 
always the example of what not to do. See, e.g., LIEBER, supra note 5, at 181 [at 2018]. A 
rare exception is the following: "Absolutism aided greatly in effecting that general plan of 
education, which we behold in its vast results, in Prussia; let us take its best fruits, without 
going through the same political process. France has done so." Id. at 221 [at 2044]. TTiis is 
a rather backhanded compliment—France had the good sense to copy Prussia—but posi­
tively generous compared to most of Lieber's work. 
8 His own account is melodramatic but affecting; 
When the day appointed for the enlistment of the volunteers arrived, we went 
to my father, and said, "Well, then, we go; is it with your consent?" "Go to 
your mother," he replied. We went to her; our hearts were big; she had suf­
fered so much during the first campaign. With a half-choked voice I said; 
"Mother, we go to be enrolled, shall we?" She fell into our arms, that noble 
woman, and sobbed aloud. "Go," was all her bleeding heart allowed her to 
utter; and had she been the mother of twenty sons, she would have sent them 
all. 
FRANCIS LIEBER, Personal Reminiscences of the Battle of Waterloo, in 1 THE MISCELLANE­
OUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER, supra note 2, at 149,152. 
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lifelong pattern, he was remarkably successful at what we would 
now call networking. His circle included Jeremy Bentham and 
John Austin, among other leading intellectual figures. 
The following year, Lieber emigrated to America. He spent 
the next six years in Boston, writing, teaching swimming, and asso­
ciating with leading academic and political figures. As he had done 
in London, he managed to fall in with the intellectual elite of Bos-
ton.® His major project during these years, and the first of many 
instances of intellectual entrepreneurship, was the Encyclopedia 
Americana, the first American general knowledge encyclopedia. 
The first volume appeared in 1828; the thirteenth and last in 1833. 
Lieber enlisted many of his friends to contribute. Among them 
was Joseph Story, who wrote all of the many articles on legal 
topics. 
With the encyclopedia complete, Lieber moved to New York 
City in 1832, and to Philadelphia in 1833. There he devoted a year 
to producing a plan for Girard College, a school for orphans in 
Philadelphia founded by a $5 million bequest from Stephen 
Girard.^" Professor Lawrence Cunningham, who is in a position to 
know, describes Lieber's plan for Girard College as "ingenious."" 
As Frank Freidel writes: 
Lieber enthusiastically prepared a plan of education in keeping 
with the spectacular five-million-dollar Girard bequest. He 
wished it to be the means of "carrying over some of the fruits of 
long and toilsome experience in Europe . . . and planting them 
[in] the fresh and rich soil of this new world." Consequently, he 
liberally interpreted the wiU to embrace no mere orphan school 
but a comprehensive polytechnic and teacher-training institu­
tion. It would offer a wide range of courses and encompass 
shops, laboratories, an observatory, and a press. He proposed 
the discussion technique for teaching some courses, and wished 
to bar corporal punishment on the upper levels.^^ 
9 And their guests. In 1831 Lieber met Alexis de Tocqueville during the Frenchman's 
visit to Boston. The two remained friends and correspondents thereafter. Lieber trans­
lated de Tocqueville and de Beaumont's Le Systeme Penitentiare for publication in the 
United States and was de Tocqueville's American correspondent during the latter's brief 
stint as a newspaper editor. ANDRE JARDIN, TOCQUEVILLE: A BIOGRAPHY 150-51,391-92 
(Lydia Davis & Robert Hemenway trans., Farrar Straus Giroux 1988) (1984). 
to Lieber uses Girard's will as an illustration in a couple of places in Hermeneutics. See 
LIEBER, supra note 5, at 94-95, 100-01 [at 1957,1960-61]. 
It Lawrence A. Cunningham, Hermeneutics and Contract Default Rules: An Essay on 
Lieber and Corbin, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2225, 2247 n.95 (1995). 
T2 FREIDEL, supra note 4, at 106 (quoting letter from Francis Lieber to Nicholas Biddle, 
Sept. 1,1833). 
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In his contribution to the present symposium, Dean Aviam Soifer 
offers a quick guided tour of Lieber's hugely detailed plan, which 
he considers pragmatic, nuanced, and enlightened.^^ 
Throughout these years, Lieber had unsuccessfully sought an 
academic appointment. In 1835 he finally obtained a professorship 
in history and political economy at South Carolina College (now 
the University of South Carolina). There he remained for more 
than twenty years, most of them spent trying to leave. Despite his 
discontent, it was during this time that he produced his most sub­
stantial pieces of scholarship. This is not the place for an account 
of that work; the bibliography gives an indication of its volume and 
scope. Three books stand out. One is the volume reprinted here. 
Legal and Political Hermendutics. The second is the book of which 
Hermeneutics was originally to be a part, the Manual of Political 
Ethics,^'^ which dealt with the moral (or, to use a more modem 
synonym, civic) and democratic responsibilities of citizens. Mike 
Horenstein's article in this issue discusses the Political Ethics at 
length, explicating Lieber's complex moral and political philoso­
phy.^^ The third, and what was Lieber's most successful and long-
lasting work of political science/constitutional law, was On Civil 
Liberty and Self-Governments^ which first appeared in 1853.^' 
Each of these works went through multiple editions and was re­
published posthumously by leading academics late in the nine­
teenth century. Indeed, a fourth edition of Civil Liberty appeared 
as late as 1901. 
Lieber resigned from South Carolina College, after having 
been denied the presidency of that institution, in December 1856, 
and moved to New York City. Once in New York he obtained an 
appointment at Columbia University. The major episode of 
Lieber's years at Columbia—personally, politically, and profes­
sionally—was, not surprisingly, the Civil War. Personally, the war 
Aviam Soifer, Facts, Things, and the Orphans of Girard College: Francis Liebber, 
Protopragmatist, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2305 (1995). 
14 FRANCIS LIEBER, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ETHICS (Boston, Charles C. Little & James 
Brown 1838-1839). This work is illuminatingly discussed in Carrington, supra note 6, at 
368-90. 
15 Mike R. Horenstein, The Virtues of Interpretation in a Jural Society, 16 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2273 (1995). 
15 FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT (Philadelphia, Lippin-
cott, Grambo 1853). For a full discussion, see BROWN, supra 4; FREIDEL, supra note 4, at 
266-74. 
11 Civil Liberty appeared in a second edition in 1859. After Lieber's death, Theodore 
Woolsey prepared a third edition, which appeared in 1874. A fourth edition was published 
in 1901. 
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was significant because Lieber's three sons all fought in it. Hamil­
ton, who lost an arm, and Norman fought for the North; their older 
brother, Oscar (sometimes said to have been Lieber's favorite) for 
the South. Oscar was fatally wounded at Williamsburg, where Nor­
man fought for the Union, and died ranting against his father. 
The war also saw Lieber's most direct involvement in political 
affairs. His antislavery sentiments, largely suppressed, at least in 
public, during his years in the South, were now given free rein in 
public speeches and through a series of antislavery pamphlets writ­
ten for the Loyal Publication Society,^® where he was first chair of 
the publication committee and then President. Though Lieber was 
not always a satisfying or successful stylist in his adopted tongue,^' 
some of his antislavery writing is quite powerful.^" 
The Civil War also prompted what has proved to be Lieber's 
most enduring legal contribution. In 1863, he drafted General Or­
ders No. 100, setting out in 157 numbered paragraphs rules of con­
duct for the Union armies in the field. Often referred to as the 
Lieber Code or Lieber's Instructions, this was the first codification 
of the laws of warfare.^^ It was this hugely influential work^^ that 
prompted Secretary of State Elihu Root to say: "If our Society [the 
18 The Society's mission is reflected in the following resolution, adopted at its inaugural 
meeting on February 14,1863: 
Resolved, That the object of this organization is, and shall be confined to, the 
distribution of Journals and Documents of unquestionable and unconditional 
loyalty throughout the United States, and particularly in the Armies now en­
gaged in the suppression of the Rebellion, and to counteract, as far as possible, 
the efforts now being made by the enemies of the Government and the advo­
cates of a disgraceful peace to circulate journals and documents of a disloyal 
cliflrdctcr* 
FRANCIS LIEBER, NO PARTY Now, BUT ALL FOR OUR COUNTRY (1863) (inside front 
cover). 
19 For an example of how excruciating his writing could sometimes be, see LIEBER, 
supra note 5, at 78 [at 1945] (sentence beginning "Yet to fix"). Fortunately sentences such 
as this are the exception. 
20 See, e.g., FRANCIS LIEBER, Amendments to the Constitution, Submitted to the Consid­
eration of the American People, in 1 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER, 
supra note 2, at 137,169-72. 
21 For an overview, see Richard S. Hartigan, Introduction to LIEBER'S CODE AND THE 
LAW OF WAR 1 (Richard S. Hartigan ed., 1983). The year before, Lieber had written 
Guerilla Parties Considered with Regard to the Laws and Usages of War. This was part of 
the same overall project. Lieber's Code is generally acclaimed as humane and progressive. 
See, e.g., James F. Childress, Francis Lieber's Interpretation of the Laws of War: General 
Orders No. 100 in the Context of His Life and Thought, 21 AM. J. JURIS. 34, 70 (1976) 
(characterizing General Orders No. ICQ as "a monument and a signpost and, moreover, an 
inspiration to constant reflection on morality and law in war"); George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., 
Humanitarian Law: The Lincoln-Lieber Connection, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 245 
(1982). For a dissenting view, however, see Chris af Jochnick & Roger Norman, The Legit­
imation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 65-66 
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American Society of International Law], at once national and in­
ternational, were about to choose a patron saint, and the roll were 
to be called, my voice for one would answer, 'Francis Lieber.' 
Following the war, Lieber was appointed by the War Depart­
ment to catalogue and preserve the Confederate archives. He also 
served as an umpire on the Mexican Claims Commission. Lieber 
was transferred to the Columbia Law School in 1865, where he and 
Theodore Dwight constituted the entire faculty, and remained at 
Columbia until his death in 1872. 
Ill 
Why should we bother to read Lieber's Hermeneutics more 
than a century and a half after its first publication? Echoing 
Thomas Jefferson's well-knovm admonition about idealizing the 
framers,^'* Lieber himself warns against being overpreoccupied 
with older authorities: 
We have in this particular to guard ourselves against an inordi­
nate veneration of old authors, merely because they are old, or 
against a too implicit reliance upon old authors, simply because 
they have been relied upon so long. Science advances, and it 
would be a matter of great regret if successive centuries were 
unable to supersede by their labors some works of previous pe-
(1994) (objecting that the Code, in common with other statements of the law of war, under­
cuts its apparent protections with an overbroad "military necessity" exception). 
22 Lieber's Code was adopted by the Prussian Army in 1870 and was the basis of late 
nineteenth-century international efforts to codify the law of war. It directly underlies the 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and elements of it can still be seen in the Geneva 
Convention. See generally Hartigan, supra note 21, at 22-23; Telford Taylor, Foreword to 
THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY at xviii (Leon Friedman ed., 1972) (label­
ling Lieber Code the "germinal document for codification of the laws of land warfare"). 
23 Elihu Root, Francis Lieber, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 453, 466 (1913), reprinted in ELIHU 
ROOT, ADDRESSES ON INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS 89 (1916); see also Root, supra, at 459: 
[W]e cannot fail to set a high estimate upon the service of the man who gave 
form and direction and effectiveness to the civilizing movement by which man 
at his best, through the concurrence of nations, imposes the restraint of rules of 
right conduct, upon man at his worst, in the extreme exercise of force. 
24 Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them 
like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men 
of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to 
be beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with 
it. It deserved well of its country. It was very like the present, but without the 
experience of the present; and forty years of experience in government is worth 
a century of book-reading; and to this they would say themselves, were they to 
rise from the dead. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THE PORTABLE 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 552, 558-59 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975). 
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nods, though they have justly enjoyed, and for a long time, the 
reputation of authority.^® 
Several of the authors in the present symposium have successfully 
guarded themselves against the inordinate veneration of Francis 
Lieber, and the purpose of reprinting Hermeneutics is not to en­
courage a "too implicit reliance upon" it. Lieber will not smgle-
handedly guide us out of the contemporary interpretive thicket. To 
the extent he is right, many of his insights have become received 
wisdom and/or taken over by others.^^ And he is not al\^ys right, 
he oversimplifies, his assumptions can be unsatisfying, he barely 
hints at the relativism that even the least postmodern contempo­
rary reader assumes. On the other hand, the contributors to this 
symposium find much of value in Lieber's work and several—nota­
bly Binder, Horenstein, Soifer, and Cunningham argue that 
Lieber has important, neglected, and directly applicable insists 
that modem lawyers and philosophers should not ignore, ine 
reader can judge Lieber's value for him or herself. Let me suggest 
a few reasons, however, why his work in general and Hermeneutics 
in particular merit close attention. 
In part Lieber is important because in so many ways he came 
first "Lieber was the first . . . American law teacher to write a 
work on law and economics. He was the first Amencan law 
teacher to do survey research. He was the first American encyclo-
oedist. He was arguably the first American legal comparatiyist. 
To this accounting might be added Lieber's 
education,^® criminal punishment,^' and property^^-all of which 
25 LIEBER supra note 5, at 91-92 [at 1954-55]; see also id. at 186-^ [at 2021-23]. "We 
are. indeed, as to experience, the old ones, and the past generations the young ones .... 
26 MgSupra note 6, at 348 ("Lieber's works do not merit reading as a source of 
insights unavailable in more accessible contemporary work. ). 
27 Id. at 357 (footnotes omitted). 
28 Lieber had relatively little formal education-not for want of 
sistently unpopular classroom teacher. Nonetheless, he was 
tical and spiritual value of education and had strong views on how it should P® 
These included the autodidact's conviction that formal education is incomplete. I" addi 
S^toThe Ptoi for Srard College, perhaps the most interesting, and most modem, of his 
writings is an 1835 pamphlet entitled Remarks on the Relation Between 
Crimr Backed up by statistics, here Lieber argued that comprehensive public education 
was a critical weapon in the war against crime, as we would say ^Ziy 
note 4 at 104 Several relevant essays appear in the Miscellaneous Writings. On the smy 
TPOREL ZI^GES, 1 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER, note 
2 at 281- On The Necessity of Continued Self-Education, 1 THE MISCEL^NE 
TTC OP FTANCIS LIEBER supra note 2, at 281 (1851 commencement address at South 
Mm ^ ^fXAr^cienZnd the Modern Teacher of Politics. 
WRMNOSTPR^^^^^^ LIEBER, supra note 2, at 329 (inaugural address at Columbia); and 
1995] REDISCOVERING FRANCIS LIEBER 2115 
were strikingly original for their time.^^ As for Hermeneutics, it not 
only introduced the term "hermeneutics,"^^ it broke "new ground 
as the first substantial American work on legislation and on the 
doctrine of precedent. It can fairly be said to be the first American 
book applying techniques of literary criticism to legal 
institutions."^^ 
More important than coming first, of course, is not also being 
last. Lieber's work, though not often cited, was influential. Francis 
Mootz asserts that, "[tjhe nineteenth-century hermeneutical tradi­
tion in Continental philosophy has had an enduring effect on 
American legal theory and practice through Lieber's scholar­
ship."^'* This may be an overstatement. While Lieber's work has 
surely infiltrated into modem legal culture, it has received little di­
rect attention in this century. It is therefore hard to quantify his 
importance in American intellectual and legal history. Yet this too 
is one reason why Lieber merits a closer look. As Mike Horenstein 
aptly puts it, "Lieber's thought... remains somewhere in the light 
Religious Instruction in Colleges, 2 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER, 
supra note 2, at 525. 
29 In addition to Lieber's translation of de Beaumont and de Tocqueville, see On Penal 
LMW, published as a pamphlet in 1838 and reprinted in 1 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINOS 
OF FRANCIS LIEBER, supra note 2, at 469 (endorsing solitary confinement and philoso­
phizing about the nature of just and effective punishments). Solitary confinement was a 
particular hobby horse of Lieber's. 
30 See FRANCIS LIEBER, ESSAYS ON PROPERTY AND LABOUR (1841). It is this work to 
which Carrington refers in describing Lieber as the first American law professor to write a 
work of law and economics. 
31 A complete bibliography of Lieber's writings appears in A Lieber Bibliography, with 
Annotations, supra note 6, at 2321. I note only in passing that among his firsts, Lieber ran 
what was apparently the first swimming school in the United States. See Hoeflich, supra 
note 3, at 729. 
32 Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux, Preface to INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERA­
TURE at ix (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988). Lieber was aware that his 
readership would not be familiar with the term, and carefully laid out its meaning and 
etymology. LIEBER, supra note 5, at 52 [at 1927]. 
33 Carrington, supra note 6, at 362; see also Hoeflich, supra note 3, at 729 (describing 
Hermeneutics as the first American attempt to devise a set of canons of legal interpreta­
tion); Roberta Kevelson, Semiotics and Methods of Legal Inquiry: Interpretation and Dis­
covery in Law from the Perspective of Pierce's Speculative Rhetoric, 61 IND. L.J. 355, 356 
(1986) (Lieber's Hermeneutics was "the first major expression of a semiotic approach to 
legal discovery and interpretation"). 
34 Francis J. Mootz III, The New Legal Hermeneutics, 47 VAND. L. REV. 115, 116-17 
(1994); see also Thomas G. Barnes, Introduction to FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLIT­
ICAL HERMENEUTICS 4 (Thomas G. Barnes ed., 1994) (2d ed. 1839) (introduction sepa­
rately published) ("[TJhis classic made a lasting contribution to American legal literature 
and learning at a critical juncture in the development of our juristic tradition."). 
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and shadow of American law, in need of both retrieval and 
rearticulation."^® 
Many of the particulars of Lieber's thought remain relevant to 
our own efforts to grapple with law and governance in a constitu­
tional democracy. For example, Paul Carrington has written else­
where that Lieber's thoughts "resonate" with the contemporary 
revival of civic Republicanism, and also overlap with "related 
thoughts about democratic education and political ethics that can 
be found in the work of such contemporary authors as Amy Gut-
mann and Dennis Thompson."^ The idea to which Lieber was 
most attached, lurking in Hermeneutics and dominating his other 
work, is captured in a favorite phrase: "No right without its duty, 
no duty without its right."^^ This principle is as topical now as a 
century and a half ago.^® 
Such links to modem debates are numerous in Hermeneutics. 
Needless to say, Lieber's general topic is, and always will be, rele­
vant in any age. But there are more specific connections as well. 
Lieber offers a set of interpretive canons, many of which overlap 
with those that are still common in judicial opinions. Debate over 
both the particulars and the general approach remains very much 
with us. Although the canons are consistently ridiculed^^ and occa­
sionally eulogized, reports of their death have always proven to 
35 Horenstein, supra note 15, at 2279. 
36 Carrington, supra note 6, at 348 (footnotes omitted). 
37 Lieber was sufficiently taken with this idea that he apparently had it engraved on his 
stationery. THAYER, supra note 2, at 45; Childress, supra note 21, at 48 n.44. He described 
this principle as "perhaps the only thing I shall have contributed to jurisprudence when I 
die." Letter from Francis Lieber to S.A. Allibone (Feb. 15,1870), quoted in id. at 48 n.44. 
38 Lieber's slogan sounds more Hohfeldian than it is. Whereas Hohfeld's jural correla­
tives of right and duty exist in two separate persons, or in one person and in the state, 
Lieber's is a quasimoral principle that views right and duty as both residing in each individ­
ual. He writes in Political Ethics: 
The very condition of right is obligation; the only reasonableness of obligations 
consists in rights. Since, therefore, a greater degree of civil liberty implies the 
enjoyment of more extended acknowledged rights, man's obligations increase 
with man's liberty. Let us, then, call that freedom of action which is deter­
mined and limited by the acknowledgement of obligation. Liberty; freedom of 
action without limitation by obligation. Licentiousness. The greater the liberty, 
the more the duty. For, the less bound or circumscribed we are in our actions 
from without, the more indispensable it becomes that we bind ourselves from 
within, that is, by reason and conscience. 
1 LIBBER, supra note 14, at 384. 
39 The classic instance being, of course, Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Ap­
pellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 
VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) (detailing the "thrust and parry" of counteracting canons). 
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have been exaggerated.'*" The courts are as wed to canons, at least 
in writing opinions, whether or not in deciding cases, as ever. And 
while many commentators have launched massive assaults on ca­
nonical approaches, Lieber was only the first of many to endorse 
such an approach, reaching to the present day most prominently in 
the work of Cass Sunstein.'** In his contribution to this volume. 
Prof. William Eskridge, Jr. points out Lieber's "prescience" with 
regard to contemporary theoretical battles over statutory interpre­
tation.'*^ Bruce Ackerman's description of the moment of constitu­
tion-making as a period of "heightened mobilization'"*^ was 
prefigured by Lieber's view that if there is a justification for 
privileging "framers' intent" it is not that the framers knew more, 
but that their circumstances "were more exciting to virtue.'"*'* The 
40 See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 Wis. 
L. REV. 1179,1180 ("[I]n the years following Llewellyn's work, it was conceivable that the 
outdated reliance on maxims would soon give way to a more enlightened approach to 
statutory interpretation. That optimism did not prove warranted."). 
41 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 147-92 (1993). For a col­
lection of recent academic discussion of interpretive canons, see Symposium, A Reevalua-
tion of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 529 (1992). The 
contributors to the present issue do not focus on the canonical nature of Lieber's proposals 
per se. The usual attacks on such an approach focus on problems of internal contradiction, 
indeterminacy, and democratic illegitimacy. To the extent they are valid, these criticisms 
apply to Lieber's principles of interpretation and construction as fully as to other systems 
of canons. In places, criticizing Lieber on these grounds is like shooting flsh in a barrel. 
For example, he states that because "public welfare is the supremest law of every country," 
the obligation to further the public welfare applies to all interpretation. Lieber notes that 
people too often (1) assume that the public welfare amounts only to economic prosperity 
and (2) confuse their own interests with the public welfare. LIEBER, supra note 5, at 172-73 
[at 2012-13]. It is very hard to take the public welfare constraint seriously as a neutral 
principle limiting interpretation. To the contrary, it looks more like the opening for extrav­
agant construction and personal whim. Such a concern is compounded when we are told 
that the general welfare does not consist of what people "frequently" think it does, but 
something else; viz., what Francis Lieber thinks it does. 
All that said, in general I think Lieber offers his canons in a useful, realistic, and 
reasonably flexible way. As Paul Carrington has written, he would not have been surprised 
by the Llewellyn critique. Carrington, supra note 1, at 306. 
42 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Fetch Some Soupmeat," 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2209, 
2222 (1995). 
43 Bruce Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,1023,1049 (1984). 
44 It frequently happens, that a fundamental law of a country is adopted at a pe­
riod when universal enthusiasm renders purity of action more common than is 
the case in easy times, when self-devotion is little called for and selfishness 
diffuses itself in all classes. Thus it was a great epoch when the American colo­
nies declared themselves free, and there can be no doubt that there was more 
self-devotion in that congress at Philadelphia than in our easy times will be 
found in an equally large number of men. Those times were more exciting to 
virtue, and if we speak of the patriotic signers, there is truth in the expression 
"wisdom of our fathers." Not that they were better organized beings, for the 
favorite saying of Lord Nelson, that there are as good fish left in the sea as have 
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list could be continued. The point is that Lieber's issues were our 
issues, even in the particulars, and reconsidering his insights while 
critically evaluating his blind spots should help us to "supersede by 
[our] labors some works of previous periods.'"*^ 
Hermeneutics speaks to today's readers not only because its 
subject is relevant. In certain ways Lieber displays a distinctly 
modern cast of mind as well. I would point to two particular as­
pects of Lieber's approach that help ensure his continued rele­
vance. Most obviously, he prefigures a central tenet of modem 
literary theory: "the ubiquity of interpretation in the process of 
reading every text—even where it seems to us as readers that no 
active interpretation is taking place at all.'"^ As Wolfgang 
Holdheim explains in his contribution to the present volume, 
Lieber (following Friedrich Schleiermacher) was at the then-cut­
ting edge of a "Copemican revolution" in understanding that fi­
nally reco^ized that interpretation is unavoidable, that no text 
interprets itself.'*' 
The second aspect of Lieber's analysis with a contemporary 
feel that I would highlight concems categorization. For the mod-
era reader, much of what is tedious about nineteenth-century legal 
writing is the endless categorizing: scholarship as taxonomy. List­
ing categories seems a poor substitute for understanding them, and 
the whole enterprise is undermined by our suspicion that the cate­
gories do not reflect any ultimate, natural truth but are only a con­
structed and artificial system. As Larry Lessig points out, Lieber 
undeniably had the nineteenth-century (and, one might add, Ger­
manic) tendency toward categorization.'*® But Lieber also was 
aware that his categories constantly threatened to collapse, that 
differences were ones of degree more than kind, and that other 
categorizations were possible. For example, he recognizes that the 
central distinction of his whole work, the difference between inter-
come out of it, is very true, but the combination of circumstances was more 
favorable. 
LIEBER, supra note 5, at 187-88 [at 2022]; see also id. at 219-22 [at 2043-45], 
45 Id. at 91 [at 1955] (originally quoted in text at supra note 25). 
45 Levinson & Mailloux, supra note 32, at x. 
47 See Wolfgang Holdheim, A Hermeneutic Thinker, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2153, 2156 
(1995); see also William G. Hammond, Appendix to LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEU­
TICS, supra note 5, at 245-46 [at 2063] (Note C: On the Province of Legal Hermeneutics). 
48 See Lawrence Lessig, The Limits of Lieber, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2249,2254 (1995). 
This surfaces in many places in Hermeneutics, for example in the lengthy breakdown of the 
different types of interpretation and construction, LIEBER, supra note 5, at 54-70 [at 1928-
39], and in the categorization of different types of constitutions, id. at 167-68 [at 2009-10]. 
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pretation and construction, will not always hold in practice, how­
ever clear it is in theory: 
It lies likewise in the nature of things that, in many cases, inter­
pretation and construction must closely approach to one an­
other; but the distinction is clear. Food and poison are very 
distinct things, although in some cases they approach so closely 
that it would be difficult to decide, with absolute certainty, 
which term we ought to choose.'*® 
At the outset he distinguishes interpretation from conjecture, only 
immediately to concede that "[sjtill it lies in the nature of things, 
that, in some cases, they approach to each other. Likewise "ob­
jects of the physical world are not so distinctly defined from each 
other as they appear to be at first glance. Innumerable transitions 
exist between them."^^ And, in a sentence added for the third edi­
tion: "Even sensations are not absolutely divided by a line of de­
marcation; the highest delight borders on pain."^^ \^ile rejecting 
"literal interpretation" and insisting on recognizing "tropes as 
tropes," he also acknowledges that "it is very difficult to say where 
the literal signification of a word ends, and the figurative begins. 
Moreover, while words have a core of clear meaning, they become 
more uncertain "the farther we remove from that centre, some­
what like certain territories of civilized people bordering on wild 
regions."^'* For this reader, at least, Lieber's recognition—even his 
frustration, perhaps—that his categories are so unstable redeems 
much of what might otherwise be wooden and artificial.^^ 
Finally, Lieber's mind was sufficiently lively that one comes 
across nuggets of insight or arresting phrases in even his dreariest 
and least interesting passages. For example, in my view the last 
two chapters of Hermeneutics are the least successful of the book. 
The discussion of precedents is noncommittal and unsophisticated 
(this may be where Lieber's lack of legal training was most inca­
pacitating). Indeed, it is one place where the editor outshines the 
49 LFFIBER, supra note 5, at 53 [at 1927-28]. 
50 Id. at 9 [at 1898-99], 
51 Id. at 22 [at 1907]. 
52 Id. at 23 [at 1907-08]. 
53 Id. at 54-55 [at 1928-29]. 
54 Id. at 15 [at 1902]. As Eskridge points out, Lieber here exactly prefigures H.L.A. 
Hart's distinction between the core and the penumbra. See Eskridge, supra note 42, at 
2213. 
55 Avi Soifer points to a related aspect of Lieber's thinking: his relative comfort with 
paradox. Soifer, supra note 13, at 2310. In particular, Soifer writes, "Lieber sought to 
struggle towards what he repeatedly claimed to be unreachable." Id. Categorization may 
be one of those unreachable things. Certainly, Lieber's acceptance of paradox brings him 
closer to a modem audience than many of his contemporaries. 
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author.^® Yet even here there is the occasional striking proposition 
or turn of phrase: for example, the aphoristic observation that "the 
more the advocates of a political measure feel themselves obliged 
to rely on precedents, the less they ought to be trusted,"®' or the 
objection, in keeping with his keenly dynamic sense of law and his­
tory, that an "idolatry of precedents ... at times has slaughtered 
Justice at her own altars."®® 
In commenting on the greater value of more recent authors, 
Lieber notes the advantage that "they relate to cases applying to 
the same circumstances and conditions with our own; they speak 
the same language with ourselves."®' Lieber is decidedly not a re­
cent author, and circumstances and conditions have changed vastly 
since his day. To a surprising extent, however, he does "speak the 
same language with ourselves." 
IV 
Most people are at least surprised, if not astonished, to leam 
that in 1837 someone wrote a book called Legal and Political Her-
meneutics. "Hermeneutics" seems so (post)modem, so trendy, that 
it is a bit like learning that Robert Fulton, in addition to developing 
the steamboat, was also doing important work with personal com­
puters. Law professors usually see "the very word 'hermeneutics' 
[as] a refugee from the English departments of the 1970s" that has 
only recently become "one of the darlings of current scholarly fash­
ion."®" My comments in the previous section notwithstanding, the 
book itself is in fact less ahead of its time than its title suggests. 
Had it been called "Rules of Statutory and Constitutional Interpre­
tation," as it could have been, it would sound a good deal less eso­
teric and intriguing to the modem ear.®^ In this section, I will 
56 See LIEBER, supra note 5, at 312-30 [at 2093-2105] (Hammond comments). 
57 Id. at 203 [at 2033], 
58 Id. at 208-09 [at 2036]. 
59 Id. at 226 [at 2047]. 
60 Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the Autonomous 
Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1065,1068 (1993) (reporting results of Westlaw search that 
showed 37 law review uses of the word from 1982-1984 and 297 from 1990-1992). 
61 Lieber's odd title dismayed at least some of his readers. Chancellor Kent's son, Wil­
liam, objected: "What, in God's name, made you choose 'Hermeneutics'! Had you called 
your . . . book 'principles of Interpretation,' . .. many an honest fellow, now frightened 
away, would have read & enjoyed the writings." FREIDEL, supra note 4, at 175 (quoting a 
Dec. 19,1843 letter from William Kent to Francis Lieber). On the title pages of his later 
works, Lieber was consistently identified as, among other things, the author of "Principles 
of Legal and Political Interpretation"—a work which does not exist. See, e.g., CIVIL LIB­
ERTY, supra note 16, at title page (1853,2d ed. 1859,3d ed. 1877); MANUAL OF POLITICAL 
ETHICS, supra note 14, at title page; 1 & 2 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS, supra note 2, 
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briefly describe the interpretive program that lies behind Lieber's 
fancy title, and summarize the discussions of Lieber's views that 
are provided by the other contributors to this volume. 
A 
Lieber is today best remembered for his codification of the 
laws of war. While this project was in some ways a sidelight (one 
of many) to his primary work in political science and constitutional 
law, it is, in a way, altogether fitting that Lieber be so identified 
with the law of war. For it is the most extreme (or, perhaps, naive 
and optimistic) example of his deep commitment to, and belief in, 
the rule of law. For Lieber it was a mark of civilized society that it 
subject the acts of soldiers during wartime—what seems the most 
lawless of circumstances—to a set of written rules of conduct. 
A preoccupation with the rule of law, or, as he usually phrased 
it, "the supremacy of law,"®^ dominates all of Lieber's work. From 
many possible instances, let me offer just one other slightly curious 
illustration, written right at the outset of his American career. In a 
collection of sketches about travels in the United States, Lieber 
gave three reasons why political defeat does not make people in­
sane in this country One is that the frequency of elections allows 
a wait-til-next-year attitude that prevents profound discourage­
ment, another that "no dishonor whatever" attaches to political de­
feat. But the third, and, one senses, most important reason, is that 
"the people know very well that their Uves and property are not in 
jeopardy, that whatever party may come in or go out, the broad 
principle of the whole system will be acted upon, the general laws 
will be observed."®^ Warming to his subject, he goes on to assert 
that the idea that "liberty exists only where the majority can do 
what they please"^® is a "monstrous idea":®® 
[0]n the contrary, the degree of existing liberty can justly be 
measured only by the degree of undoubted protection which the 
minority enjoy, and the degree in which the sovereign, be he one 
at title pages. One cannot but wonder whether this paraphrase of the actual title and subti­
tle reflected editorial discomfort with the "h" word. 
See, e.g., LIEBER, supra note 5, at 40, 128 [at 1919,1983]. 
63 In contrast to France, of course, where the asylums were apparently crammed with 
the losers of political contests. 
6* 2 FRANCIS LIEBER, THE STRANGER IN AMERICA: COMPRISING SKETCHES OF THE 
MANNERS, SOCIETY, AND NATIONAL PECULIARITIES OF THE UNITED STATES, IN A SERIES 
OF LETTERS TO A FRIEND IN EUROPE 25 (London, Bentley 1835). 
65 Id. at 26. 
66 Id. at 25; cf. supra note 37 (quoting Lieber's distinction between liberty and 
licentiousness). 
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or many, or represented by the majority, is restricted, by funda­
mental laws, from acting on sudden impulses and impassioned 
caprices.®^ 
Hermeneutics cannot be understood, I think, except in light of 
this preoccupation with the rule of law. Lieber rejects either of two 
approaches to government. First, he insists that government be 
limited by law. Simply to abandon law in favor of discretion or 
common sense is to invite tyranny. Such a scheme is appropriate 
for running the family because the head has the best interests of 
the other family members at heart; but as an approach for running 
a country it spells disaster for personal and civil liberties.^® Second, 
Lieber understands that in a government of laws, not men, the laws 
will not speak for themselves. As his aphoristic first sentence indi­
cates, and as he reiterates time and again, interpretation is always 
necessary. Yet false interpretations of one sort or another had 
LIEBER, supra note 64, at 26. 
68 The debate is of course still very much with us. As I was preparing this essay, Cass 
Sunstein reviewed Philip Howard's The Death of Common Sense in the New York Times. 
Howard argues that America is now choking on law. He would trade in the modern ver­
sion of the rule of law for a regime based on common sense and cooperation. See PHILIP 
K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA 
(1994). Sunstein reminds us, however, that 
[o]nce freed from rules, public officials and private citizens may exercise their 
discretion invidiously. They may be confused, biased or corrupt. Without 
rules, it may be very hard to monitor whether people are doing what they 
should do. And without fair process, officials may make damaging mis­
takes. ... In some contexts rules and rights are indispensable; the alternatives 
would be much worse. 
Cass R. Sunstein, Land of 4,000 Unreadable Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1995, § 7 (Book 
Review), at 12. Sunstein does not cite Lieber, but he easily could have. 
On the other hand, one of Howard's central contentions is pure Lieber. Echoing, in 
his title and elsewhere, Lieber's repeated invocations of common sense, Howard launches 
a particular attack on overdetailed rules. The result of too much detail is that "[m]odem 
law is unknowable." HOWARD, supra, at 30. The misguided "quest for protection through 
certainty" leads only to "arbitrary power." Id. at 32. "Loopholes only exist because of 
precise rules. The Constitution, a short document of general principles, has no loopholes." 
Id. at 43. It is Lieber who offers the classic argument as to the futility of "attempting to 
speak with absolute clearness and endless specifications." LIEBER, supra note 5, at 19 [at 
1905]. This is the point of the famous soupmeat hypothetical. See id. at 18 [at 1904-05]; see 
also id. at 150-51 [1997-98] (noting superiority of general over detailed instructions to 
soldiers and diplomats); Eskridge, supra note 42 (discussing soupmeat hypothetical). In­
deed, Howard and Lieber agree that efforts to constrain power and discretion through 
detail have, perversely, the opposite effect. See LIEBER, supra note 5, at 22 [at 1907] ("Tlie 
more we strive in a document to go beyond plain clearness and perspicuity, the more we do 
increase, in fact, the chances of sinister interpretation."). Lieber himself had to grapple 
with a detailed set of instructions in preparing the plan for Girard College. One wonders 
whether he learned from that experience, consciously or not, the futility of highly detailed 
prescriptions. See Soifer, supra note 13, at 2309-14 (discussing broad latitude Lieber took 
in interpreting Girard's will). 
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been the tool of tyranny.®^ Therefore, if law is to be a bulwark 
against tyranny, interpretive approaches cannot be up for grabs. 
The goal of Hermeneutics was to outline an interpretive approach 
that would, if honestly applied, ensure the rule of law. Lieber was 
not a literary critic, he was a political scientist with an intense con­
cern about good government and the avoidance of tyranny. For 
this hater of Napoleon, wounded at Waterloo and imprisoned in 
Prussia for his political beliefs, the concern over government 
abuses was much more than theoretical. His Hermeneutics—which 
was originally designed as part of a Manual—was practical, not 
theoretical, and it was aimed toward the achievement of sound 
government. 
Paul Carrington sees both Lieber's work and its 1880 republi­
cation as responses to particular, though opposite, politico-legal 
currents of the times. Carrington shows that Lieber and William 
Hammond, editor of the 1880 edition, were pursuing quite different 
goals.™ At the time of its original publication, the work was a re­
sponse to the then-prevailing view that judges were merely politi­
cians in robes and the resulting Jacksonian efforts to curb judicial 
independence. Lieber's central premise is that judges "have moral 
duties to subordinate their personal preferences and determine 
textual meanings disinterestedly" and "a unifying aim of Herme­
neutics is to make it matter as little as possible whether a judge is 
personally of one persuasion or another."'^ By 1880, the tide had 
turned; Langdellianism, conceiving law as an autonomous and 
technocratic discipline, was ascendant. In this setting, the 1880 edi­
tion (like the new editions of much of Lieber's other work around 
the same time) was a response from the opposite side of the law-as-
creation versus law-as-discovery divide than the original publica­
tion. Now Lieber was offered as a bulwark against law's "political 
69 LIEBER, supra note 5, at 38 [at 1918] (stressing indispensability of law and lawyers to 
avoid the abuses that would flow if justice was subjective and hinged on the unconstrained 
discretion of the judge or sovereign); id. at 53 [at 1928] (construction is "dangerous" but 
indispensable); id. at 76-77 [at 1944] (decrying inconsistent or double interpretations as a 
common tool of tyrannical governments); id. at 102 [at 1962] (mocking those who would 
allow authorities to rely on their intuitions and sense of the public weal rather than faith­
fully interpreting the Constitution); id. at 124 [at 1979] (bad faith interpretation has too 
often been resorted to to rob people of their property); id. at 190-91 [at 2024] (emphasizing 
value of precedent as an indicator of true law and as a bulwark against governmental "en­
croachment in the name of law"). 
70 Paul D. Carrington, William Gardiner Hammond and the Lieber Revival, 16 CAR-
Dozo L. REV. 2135 (1995). 
71 Id. at 2139. 
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sterilization by the likes of professional technocrats such as 
Langdell.""'^ 
B 
What, then, does Lieber propose? His starting point is that 
interpretation is always necessary. Because direct communication 
between minds is impossible, we must rely on intermediaries, on 
signs. For a long catalogue of reasons, the use of signs will inescap­
ably create confusion and uncertainty. The task of interpretation is 
to eliminate this confusion. For Lieber, it is essential to the proper 
functioning of government, the avoidance of tyranny, and the par­
ticipation of the citizen in public life to agree on a set of principles 
by which the inevitable interpretive tasks will be successfully 
performed. 
"Bvo of our commentators place this project within the larger 
hermeneutic tradition. Professor Wolfgang Holdheim explains that 
Lieber's conception was part of a fundamental shift in that herme­
neutic tradition, which was in turn part of the larger "Copemican 
revolution" in the history of ideas.'^ The shift was from a focus on 
the external world to the world of the mind, and within hermeneu-
tics from a belief that interpretation is "artless"—that understand­
ing is automatic and meaning self-evident—to a recognition that 
interpretation is always and everywhere necessary. As Holdheim 
explains, key to this shift, both generally and particularly for Fran­
cis Lieber, was Lieber's teacher, Friedrich Schleiermacher. Exam­
ining the particulars of Lieber's scheme, Holdheim guides us 
through Lieber's hermeneutics and situates him in a line that be­
gins with Schleiermacher and leads to Martin Heidegger and Hans-
Georg Gadamer. 
Guyora Binder also identifies Schleiermacher as a critical in­
fluence on Lieber and provides a thorough summary of 
Schleiermacher's thought.'"* In Binder's view, however, Lieber was 
equally influenced by Whig legal thought of the early nineteenth 
century, particular as articulated by Joseph Story, who was Lieber's 
friend and a substantial contributor to the Encyclopedia Ameri­
cana. In Hermeneutics, Lieber "bred Schleiermacher's romantic 
72 Id. at 2152. 
73 Holdheim, supra note 47, at 2156. 
74 Guyora Binder, Institutions and Linguistic Conventions: The Pragmatism of Lieber's 
Legal Hermeneutics, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2169 (1995). 
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philology with the Whig's institutional positivism, to spawn an ac­
count of law as the hermeneutic perpetuation of institutions.""'^ 
C 
Lieber begins with a modem premise—the inescapability of 
interpretation—but seeks to downplay the more radical implica­
tions of the premise, constructing a hermeneutics that will calm 
concerns that the failure of texts to speak directly might result in 
meaning depending on the interpreter rather than the text. In par­
ticular, a text can have only one meaning, and that meaning was 
put there by the author and is, by definition, what the author in­
tended. Lieber recognizes the external influences on interpreta­
tion; his goal, though, is to provide the rules by which they are 
controlled and the text's "one true meaning" perceived and agreed 
upon by all. Depending on your view, Lieber's "one true meaning" 
idea supplements, counterbalances, undercuts, or obliterates the 
initial premise. 
Georgia Wamke would take the last of these views.'^ She re­
jects Lieber's scheme as simply too antiquated and naive to be of 
much value today. She contrasts Lieber's insistence on "one true 
meaning" and his argument that "predestined [i.e., prejudiced] in­
terpretation" is illegitimate with Gadamer's view that meaning is 
always multiple and that all interpretation is oriented by prejudices 
or assumptions interpreters inescapably bring to the task of under­
standing. In other words, Lieber's project—to develop a set of 
principles that will ensure "neutral" and "accurate" interpretation, 
by whomever applied—is doomed from the outset. Working in­
stead with a Gadamerian conception. Professor Wamke illustrates 
the opposite approach by rearticulating the controversy over abor­
tion as a hermeneutic conversation. By acknowledging the ines­
capability of multiple meanings of the key norms and concepts in 
this debate ("liberty," "life," "autonomy," "responsibility," etc.), 
she argues, we might understand and leam from others' positions 
rather than close-mindedly, and fruitlessly, arguing for our own. 
William Eskridge, though somewhat more taken with Lieber 
than is Wamke, agrees with her assessment of his limitations. The 
failure to fully account for the fact that all meaning is situational, 
and that different readers will therefore inevitably construct differ-
75 Id. at 2184. 
76 Georgia Wamke, The One True Sense, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2191 (1995). 
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ent meanings from the same text, hugely reduces the value of 
Lieber's scheme."''' 
Some other contributors see Lieber as more subtle and sophis­
ticated. Thus, Professor Holdheim, while agreeing with Wamke 
that a "one true meaning" approach to texts is in general wholly 
inadequate, rehabilitates Lieber by "interpreting" him to be offer­
ing an instrumentally useful fiction. In the legal setting, texts 
should be treated as if they have one true meaning.^® Guyora 
Binder offers an account of Lieber as a pragmatist whose nod to 
one-true-meaning intentionalism makes more palatable what is in 
fact an endorsement of significant judicial discretion.^® And Mike 
Horenstein contends that even if "the present discourse on legal 
interpretation [is] richer, more sophisticated and varied," recover­
ing Lieber remains a necessity despite his apparent limitations.®® 
D 
At the heart of Lieber's scheme is his distinction between in­
terpretation and construction. Understanding a text begins with 
interpretation: "the art of finding out the true sense of any form of 
words; that is, the sense which their author intended to convey, and 
of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the 
author intended to convey."®^ The overall goal of all of Lieber's 
interpretive principles is to avoid manipulative and disingenuous— 
in a word, willful—interpretations. Valid interpretations require 
good faith (a requirement insisted upon time and again in Herme-
neutics), common sense, a disdain for literal readings, respect for 
authorial intention, sensitivity to context and purpose, and a pref­
erence for what is "probable, fair, and customary" over "the im­
probable, unfair and unusual."®^ 
Where interpretation does not "suffice," however, "we must 
have recourse to construction."®® "Construction is the drawing of 
77 Eskridge, supra note 42, at 2222-24. 
78 Holdheim, supra note 47, at 2162-63. 
79 Binder, supra note 74, at 2185-89. 
80 Horenstein, supra note 15, at 2273-74. I should mention here an article that does not 
even cite Lieber, but which is directly relevant to the question of whether his hermeneutics 
can withstand twentieth-century reconceptions. Francis Mootz has attempted to reformu­
late the traditional view of the rule of law—Lieber's view—in light of Gadamerian herme­
neutics. Francis J. Mootz III, Is the Rule of Law Possible in a Postmodern World?, 68 
WASH. L. REV. 249 (1993). Mootz's analysis might also be applied to salvage Lieber from 
the Gadamerian critique. 
81 LIEBER, supra note 5, at 11 [at 1900]. 
82 Id. at 109 [at 1967]. 
83 Id. at 50 [at 1926]. 
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conclusions respecting subjects, that lie beyond the direct expres­
sion of the text, from elements known from and given in the text— 
conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the letter of 
the text."®^ Most often, construction is necessary where unantici­
pated situations have arisen or background circumstances have 
changed. Interpretation is either impossible because the text sim­
ply does not address the problem at hand or (what is perhaps the 
same thing) interpretation is wrongheaded because to take the text 
at face value would produce a result wholly at odds with the au­
thor's goal.®^ The essence of construction is parallelism—what we 
would call, but Lieber is careful to distinguish from, reasoning by 
analogy.®® 
Lieber sees the interpretation and construction as sequential, 
though related. In general, what goes for interpretation also goes 
for construction; above all, both require good faith, common sense, 
and a sensitivity to the purpose and the causes of the law. In addi­
tion, Lieber lays down a number of specific principles of construc­
tion, many wholly familiar to readers of modem judicial opinions: 
the text cannot be understood to demand the impossible; privileges 
are to be construed in favor of the non-privileged party; the older a 
text, the more extensive should be its construction; the weak enjoy 
the benefit of the doubt; a compact is construed closely and ambi­
guities resolved against the drafter.®' 
Among Lieber's changes for the third edition of Hermeneutics 
was the claim that the "distinction is now . . . very generally ac­
cepted."®® Even his editor felt obliged to disagree with that opti­
mistic assessment,®^ however, and at present it can be reported that 
84 Id. at 44 [at 1921]; see also id. at 46 [at 1923] ("construction signifies the discovery of 
the spirit, principles and rules that ought to guide us according to the text"). 
85 "[T]here are considerations which ought to induce us to abandon interpretation, or 
in other words to sacrifice the direct meaning of a text to considerations still weightier; 
especially not to slaughter justice, the sovereign object of laws, for the law itself, [which is 
only] the means of obtaining it." Id. at 103 [at 1962]. 
86 Construction also has a second aspect which is really quite separate: reading a text so 
as to comply with "principles or rules of superior authority." Thus, a statute must be "con­
strued" to be consistent with the Constitution, an administrative act construed to be consis­
tent with the underlying statute, and so on. The two aspects of construction are linked in 
Lieber's mind in that they both involve "subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of 
the text." Id. at 47 [at 1923]. But in the one setting those subjects are derived, however, 
loosely, from the text, in the other they are imposed on it. 
87 Lieber's 16 rules of construction are summarized at id. at 136-37 [at 1987-88]. 
88 Id. at 50 n.* [at 1925 n.9]. 
89 Id. at 50 n.5 [at 1926 n.9]. On the other hand, an admirer wrote in 1873 that the 
distinction "has been generally adopted by legal writers." See THAYER, supra note 2, at 25, 
reprinted in 1 THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF FRANCIS LIEBER, supra note 2, at 13. 
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the construction versus interpretation distinction has almost wholly 
failed to survive as a matter of vocabulary. In isolated areas of 
private law courts and commentators use something like this for­
mulation.^ And half anyway of Lieber's vocabulary is used by 
constitutional scholars, for whom "interpretivism" refers (some­
what counterintuitively, but more or less consistently with Lieber's 
usage) to approaches to the Constitution that are relatively text-
bound and originalist. Still, for the most part the two words are 
deemed perfect synonyms. Judges and commentators seem happy 
to be equipped with two identical terms, since it allows them to 
switch from one to the other simply to avoid redundancy.®^ 
While Lieber's vocabulary is not widely adopted, the ideas it 
reflects are real: there are two separate types of interpretation—or, 
more accurately, a continuum of interpretive approaches. 
All of the articles in this issue explore the distinction between 
interpretation and construction to some degree. Four focus on it in 
particular, addressing interpretation and construction in the com­
mon law, statutory, and constitutional settings.®^ 
90 For example, black letter principles of conflicts of law distinguish between the inter­
pretation of a will and its construction. "Interpretation" is deemed an essentially factual 
inquiry into the testator's intent. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 
809 (2d ed. 1992). In contrast, the "process of completing or presuming the intention of 
the testator as to matters over which he could have exercised testamentary direction, is 
called construction." Id. at 810; see also id. at 818. It is said that conflicts rules only come 
into play with regard to questions of construction and not of interpretation, though at least 
to this outsider it does not seem necessary to pinpoint the dividing line, which will take 
care of itself as soon as the court grapples with particular legal rules. See Symeon C. Syme-
onides. Exploring the "Dismal Swamp," 47 LA. L. REV. 1029, 1073-74 (1987). 
91 See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381,2384 (1994) ("the Secre­
tary's interpretation is a reasonable construction of the regulatory language") (emphasis 
added); City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588,1593,1594 n.5 
(1994) ("Petitioners contend that our interpretation of § 3001(i)"; "petitioners' contention 
that our construction renders § 3001(i)"; "In view of our construction of § 3001(i), we need 
not consider whether an agency interpretation") (emphasis added); Good Samaritan Hosp. 
V. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151, 2161 (1993) ("where the agency's interpretation of [its regula­
tion] is at least as plausible as competing ones, there is little, if any, reason not to defer to 
its construction") (emphasis added); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, 467 U.S. 837,842,844,865 (1985) (referring interchangeably to EPA's "interpreta­
tion" and EPA's "construction" of the Clean Air Act). 
92 Missing from this list is the administrative setting. While agency interpretation is a 
type of statutory interpretation, it does not necessarily raise the same issues as statutory 
interpretation in the courts. Indeed, one might use Lieber's distinction to describe the 
division of labor between courts and agencies established in Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837. In 
Chevron the Supreme Court set out a two-step process for courts to apply in reviewing 
agency interpretations of statutes. Lieber's interpretation corresponds to Chevron's step 
one: "First, always, is the question of whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter " Id. 
at 842. The premise here is pure Lieber: Congress had an intent, the statute has one true 
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Professor Lawrence Cunningham explores the difference be­
tween Lieber's understanding of the distinction and Corbin's some­
what different understanding. Whereas for Lieber construction 
still grew out of the text being construed, for Corbin it was external 
to it—the imposition of a legal norm separate from the agreement 
or intentions of the parties. Corbin's dichotomy corresponds more 
accurately to "what judges actually do in contracts cases," but 
Lieber's view, Cunningham suggests, "offered remarkably pre­
scient prescriptions for" how to do it.^^ Specifically, Cunningham 
brings Lieber's Hermeneutics fully into the late twentieth century 
by investigating how it can help resolve the most provocative de­
bate in contemporary contracts scholarship: the struggle over de­
fault rules. Cunningham reconfigures the default rules debate 
using Lieber's distinctions between different types of construction. 
William Eskridge focuses on the part of Legal and Political 
Hermeneutics that is most familiar to the modem legal academy: 
the soupmeat hypothetical. Lieber shows how an apparently sim­
ple instruction from housekeeper to domestic—"fetch some 
soupmeat"—is only understood because of a raft of unspoken con­
ditions and implicit provisos. Lieber's particular point is that it is 
at best unnecessary, perhaps misleading, and in any event impossi­
ble to be comprehensive. Developing the hypothetical far more 
than Lieber himself had, Eskridge uses it to explicate how Lieber's 
principles of interpretation and construction operate in a specific 
meaning, and through interpretation (which is not the same as a literal reading or the self-
evident unfolding of the statute by itself and may require more than simply reading the 
statute and seeing what it says) the court comes to understand Congress's nieaning. A 
court moves to Chevron's "step two," upholding any reasonable or permissible agency 
reading, if "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," id. at 843, 
that is, if Congress has not "directly addressed the precise question at issue," id. at 843 n.9 
(emphasis added). In these circumstances. Congress has not resolved the issue and the 
Court will simply accept any reasonable agency determination. Or, as Lieber puts it: "In­
terpretation, seeking but for the true sense, forsakes us when the text is no longer directly 
applicable; because the utterer, not foreseeing this case, did not mean it, therefore, it has 
no true sense in this particular case." LIEBER, supra note 5, at 111 [at 1969] (emphasis in 
original). Construction involves subjects "beyond the direct expression of the text." Id. at 
44 [at 1921] (emphasis added). Compare Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (noting possible causes 
of statutory ambiguity) with LIEBER, supra note 5, at 27,53-54 [at 1910-11,1927-28] (giving 
similar list). 
Professors Davis and Pierce describe Chevron in just these terms, though I would not 
assume that they have Lieber in mind. 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.3, at 112 (1994) (stating that when a court or agency 
resolves a policy dispute under a vague statute, it "is not engaged in statutory interpreta­
tion. It is engaged in statutory construction."). 
93 Cunningham, supra note 11, at 2234. 
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setting.^ In doing so, he links Lieber's principles with contempo­
rary debates over statutory interpretation, noting Lieber's "presci­
ence" in anticipating, and providing some lessons for, textualism, 
the legal process school, intentionalism, and evolutive interpreta­
tion. (I discuss in the next section Eskridge's ultimate reservations 
about Lieber's interpretive guidelines). 
Eskridge's discussion helps us understand why Lieber's dis­
tinction between interpretation and construction matters so much. 
More is at issue here than a descriptive taxonomical pedantry. The 
point of the distinction is a prescriptive insistence on the legitimacy 
of a relatively creative and far-reaching approach to texts. Guyora 
Binder puts this most forcefully, arguing that Lieber's "reduction 
of intent to language was merely a stratagem to justify an active 
interpreter."®^ Certainly there is no disputing Lieber's aversion to 
narrow, blindly textual interpretation. Acknowledging that "[w]e 
have first to settle whether construction is at all admissible," Lieber 
finds the answer clear—indeed, construction is "absolutely indis­
pensable.In construction is salvation: "It is . . . construction 
alone which saves us .. . from sacrificing the spirit of a text or the 
object, to the letter of the text, or to the means by which that ob­
ject was to be obtained ... [and through construction that we avoid 
producing] the very opposite of what it was purposed to effect."®^ 
Binder's view of the liberality of Lieber's approach is borne 
out by Avi Soifer's discussion of the plan for Girard College. Here 
is the best example we have of Lieber himself actually faced with 
the sort of interpretative challenges that are the subject of Herme-
neutics. Girard had been quite specific with regard to the details of 
the new school, its educational program, and the composition of its 
student body. His two most famous and troubling restrictions were 
first that the students be only white male orphans, and second that 
no "ecclesiastic, missionary, or minister of any sect whatsoever" 
even be allowed on the premises. Soifer shows that Lieber read 
both restrictions quite liberally. Indeed, Lieber's whole approach 
Eskridge, supra note 42. Eskridge also discusses the soupmeat hypothetical in his 
recent book on statutory interpretation. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATU­
TORY INTERPRETATION 40, 53, 56-57,125-28, 246-47 (1994). 
95 Binder, supra note 74, at 2185. Binder infers a second, related normative lesson. He 
links the interpretation/construction distinction to the rules/standards distinction, and 
stresses Lieber's dismissal of the possibility of comprehensive legislative specificity. He 
then reasons backwards from Lieber's endorsement of construction by judges to an en­
dorsement of legislation that is construed rather than interpreted, that is, standards rather 
than rules. 
96 LIEBER, supra note 5, at 50 [at 1926]. 
97 Id. at 45 [at 1922]. 
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in drawing up the plan was to emphasize Girard's implicit instruc­
tions and the spirit of the bequest rather than the explicit language 
of the will.®® 
Larry Lessig picks up the normative aspect of Lieber's distinc­
tion in the context of constitutional interpretation. Drawing on 
and elaborating on an earlier article,®® Lessig analogizes construc­
tion to translation and insists, following Lieber, that such a free 
approach to the Constitution is not only "admissible" but "abso­
lutely indispensable"^®®—indeed, that properly understood it is not 
"free." Yet Lessig ultimately concludes that while Lieber is right to 
move beyond mere "interpretation" of the Constitution (or, in the 
parlance of constitutional theory, beyond "interpretivism"), his 
version of construction cannot provide adequate or satisfying con­
stitutional readings either. Lessig attributes this failure to the fact 
that Lieber does not take account of the institutional constraints 
that operate upon the Supreme Court. It is to Lieber's silence as to 
institutional concerns that I now turn. 
E 
Many of the pieces in this symposium highlight, directly and 
indirectly, one issue in particular. That issue is Lieber's under­
standing, or lack thereof, of institutions and their interactions. 
Lieber largely ignores the question of whether some persons 
or institutions might be better equipped than others to perform the 
different interpretive tasks. This is surprising. While displaying 
nothing like postmodern relativism, as Professor Wamke empha­
sizes,^®^ Lieber nonetheless took it as a given that different inter­
ests and perspective would produce different readings. As Paul 
Carrington points out, "a premise" of Hermeneutics is that "what 
thoughtful people think and say about law and its interpretation 
depends heavily on when and where they are."^®^ For example, 
Lieber rejects a plain words approach to texts precisely because the 
different interests of different readers will prevent consensus: 
"there are two parties in questions of justice, and ... what seems so 
uncommonly plain to the one that no possible doubt can exist, ac­
cording to his opinion, does by no means present itself in the same 
'8 See Soifer, supra note 13, at 2309-14. 
^ Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). 
100 LIEBER, supra note 5, at 50 [at 1926]. 
101 See Wamke, supra note 76, at 2191-92. 
102 Carrington, supra note 70, at 2151. 
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light to the other."^°^ Similarly, in his discussion of what he terms 
"predestined interpretation," he laments that "the interpreter, 
either consciously or unknown to himself, yet laboring under a 
strong bias of mind, makes the text subservient to his preconceived 
views, or some object he desires to arrive at."^"^ 
Lieber also insists that different kinds of texts require different 
interpretive approaches. He devotes chapter VI to those differ­
ences. In addition, he stresses the need to consider the particular 
context in which the text arose. At the heart of his hermeneutics 
is the insistence that meaning varies with context.^"® All of his 
rules for interpretation and construction turn on understanding the 
context (linguistic and social) of the text to be interpreted. 
Finally, as a political scientist, one who essentially bought into 
the framers' model of separated governmental powers, he thought 
and wrote about the interactions of different branches of govern­
ment, about the nature of democratic governance, about the role of 
the judiciary. Mike Horenstein's article touches on some of this 
material in Lieber's Political Ethics}°^ Institutional concerns are 
even more prominent in On Civil Liberty, which might almost be 
said to be about institutions.^"® Indeed, during his life time he was 
celebrated as someone especially sensitive to the complexities of 
institutional interactions.^"" 
In short, Lieber is keenly aware of the contingency of mean­
ing, the need for interpretation, the influence of setting, perspec-
103 LIEBER, supra note 5, at 39-40 [at 1919] (emphasis added). 
104 Id. at 60 [at 1933], 
105 Indeed, perhaps one way of stating the difference between Lieber and, say, 
Gadamer, is that while Gadamer insists that understanding is always "understanding as," 
see Warnke, supra note 76, at 2193, Lieber insists that meaning (i.e., authorial intent) is 
always "meaning as." 
106 See, e.g., LIEBER, supra note 5, at 11-12,107 [at 1900, 1965]. 
107 See Horenstein, supra note 14, at 2300-02. 
108 Freidel's analysis of On Civil Liberty focuses on Lieber's emphasis on the interplay 
of governmental and private institutions as the essential check on tyrannical absolutism. 
See FREIDEL, supra note 4, at 210-1 A. 
lof Consider the following encomium: 
Those who wish to see the progress which has been made in political science 
since the Greek phase of European history, need but read Aristotle's Politics 
and Lieber's Civil Liberty. For with all the ability of Aristotle, and none can 
rate it higher than we do, the simple political arrangements of mere city gov­
ernments depicted in his work seem trifling enough in comparison with the 
complex schemes of security and administration sketched by Lieber as the great 
polities of modern times. 
Samuel lyier, De Tocqueville and Lieber as Writers of Political Science, PRINCETON REV., 
1858, at 23-24. Tyler particularly emphasizes Lieber's emphasis on the need for institu­
tional arrangements, such as "the complex articulated government of the United States," 
id. at 22, to preserve liberty and the rule of law. 
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tive, and interest on interpretation, and the complexity of 
intragovemmental relations. All of the premises for a discussion of 
institutional capacity are present. Yet in Hermeneutics that discus­
sion never really occurs. To be sure, Hermeneutics, like his other 
work, makes repeated salutes to the independent judiciary."" This 
is a particular application of two fundamental precepts: a belief in 
the rule of law and an insistence that interpretation be conducted 
in good faith. An independent judiciary is the best means for pro­
tecting the rule of law and (by) guaranteeing good faith interpreta­
tion. But beyond this one, rather obvious, concern, a consideration 
of relative institutional capacities is quite far from the heart of 
Lieber's work."^ 
In the present volume. Professors Eskridge and Lessig focus in 
particular on this perceived failing. With regard to statutory inter­
pretation, Eskridge concludes that Lieber cannot resolve today's 
interpretational challenges. For that task, he insists, we must be 
more sensitive than was Lieber to strategic behavior, the unavoida­
ble influences of perspective, and institutional incentives."^ Les­
sig, whose concern is with constitutional interpretation, contends 
that Lieber never understands that simply ensuring a formally "in­
dependent" judiciary will not free the Supreme Court from a host 
of institutional limitations and influences. In particular, the Court 
operates within and is constrained by a legal culture that will dis­
able it from carrying out the ideal interpretive program."^ 
These criticisms, if valid, go to the heart of Lieber's project, 
for the absence of institutional considerations in Hermeneutics can­
not be ascribed to oversight or incompleteness; it grows from the 
very nature of his proposals. Lieber is confldent that the influence 
of setting, perspective, and interest can be controlled. Indeed, 
what defines correct and legitimate inte^retation is the setting 
aside of personal leanings, drawing meaning from the text rather 
than putting meaning into it.^^"* The premise is that general adop­
tion of sound rules of interpretation can avert tyranny and ensure 
110 See, e.g., LIEBER, supra note 5, at 36-37,171,178-80,193,227 [at 1917,2012-13,2016-
17, 2025-26, 2047-48]. 
111 Lieber's emphasis on the independence of the judiciary heips us not at all, for exam­
ple, in evaluating the appropriate roles of agency and judiciary under Chevron. See supra 
note 92. Chevron (or any theory of deference to agency interpretations) rests on an under­
standing of the differences between interpreters, whereas Lieber was aiming for a scheme 
in which the identity of the interpreter would not matter. 
112 Eskridge, supra note 42, at 2223-24. 
113 Lessig, supra note 48, at 2265-67. 
114 See, e.g., LIBBER, supra note 5, at 76,118-19,137 [at 1944, 1975,1988]. 
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the rule of law.^^^ Assuming good faith, it should not matter who is 
interpreting: because a text has one true meaning, because the task 
of interpretation is to discern it, and because his principles will con­
strain and guide the interpreter, just who is interpreting matters 
less than that they approach the task correctly. It is perhaps a sign 
of the depth of his conviction, or of his optimism, that he seems not 
to care about to whom the interpretive task is assigned, as long as 
they follow his rules. Of the contributors to the present volume, 
Mike Horenstein comes closest to sharing that optimism; Georgia 
Wamke is most distant. 
Finally, Guyora Binder would redeem Lieber by arguing that 
not only does he not ignore institutional considerations, he is in 
fact centrally concerned with them. Binder states that Lieber un­
derstood that "meaning inheres in language's use by communities 
of language users, especially institutions.""® Thus, for Binder, 
Lieber's entire account of the process of interpretation rests on the 
complex interplay of institutions that our other authors criticize 
him for ignoring. 
VI 
The works in the present symposium exhibit different degrees 
of enthusiasm for Lieber on the merits. Whether criticisms or en­
dorsements, however, they contribute immensely to our under­
standing of Lieber's strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, by using 
Lieber as the springboard for reflection,"' they help us think 
through the basic quandaries of interpretation, still and always 
unsolved. 
The many who pause to notice Lieber and comment that he 
has been forgotten and neglected"® also tend to comment that he 
deserves better."^ With the present symposium, he receives it. 
115 Viewed in this light, Lieber's much-criticized insistence on "the one true meaning" is 
best explained as Wolfgang Holdheim explains it: as prescriptive rather than descriptive— 
an instrumentally essential fiction. See Holdheim, supra note 47, at 2162-63. 
11® Binder, supra note 74, at 2185. 
Ill A loaded term. See Horenstein, supra note 14, at 2287 (noting Lieber's view that 
what separates humans from other animals is not the capacity for thought but the capacity 
for reflection). 
118 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
119 See, e.g., Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871,875 n.lO (1986) 
(noting that although Robert Cover "dusted off" Hermeneutics, that "artifact unfortu­
nately has been generally forgotten again"). 
